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I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change poses the greatest single threat to nearly every being on
this planet. It is the result of many factors, but anthropogenic emissions of
carbon and other greenhouse gasses (GHGs) are among the largest contributors 
to climate change.1 Though many sources emit anthropogenic GHGs, the
energy sector is the largest global emitter of any economic sector.2 As such, 
the energy sector has come under particular scrutiny as it relates to climate 
change policy. 
Today in the United States, state climate action is as prevalent as ever.  
However, the federal government’s environmental progress under the 
Obama Administration has come to a halt under the Trump Administration.
Fortunately, this shift in federal leadership has not dissuaded states.
Rather, it increased climate change activity among them.3  In light of this
increased fervor and relative youth of the renewables market—which has
 1.  See  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 47–52 (2015), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/UTG2-8PCF].
 2.  Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data [https://perma.cc/5BKP- 
3RMJ] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). 
 3.  E.g., Jerry Brown and Michael Bloomberg Launch “America’s Pledge” in Support of
Paris, BLOOMBERG PHILANTHROPIES (Oct. 29, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.org/
program/environment/americas-pledge/#overview [https://perma.cc/6HA5-RGXA] (“Led by 
California Governor Jerry Brown and Michael Bloomberg, America’s Pledge on climate 
change is a new initiative to compile and quantify the actions of states, cities and businesses in
the United States to drive down their greenhouse gas emissions consistent with the goals
of the Paris Agreement.”).
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its own inefficiencies to resolve4—plenty of reasons exist for continued 
optimism in renewable energy and state deployment thereof.5 
That said, it is imperative for policy makers to understand the federal-
state jurisdictional boundary in the energy sector. Longstanding federal
legislation broadly divides the federal and state energy regulatory spheres,
but evolving energy markets and recent case law render this jurisdictional
line sufficiently unclear. This Article parses recent cases to clarify the line 
and proposes some guiding Rules and Principles designed to simplify the 
federal-state jurisdictional boundaries. 
This Article is based on the judiciary’s Federal preemption analysis as
it relates to the Federal Power Act (FPA). Although there are related 
Commerce Clause issues, this Article is limited to analysis of federal and
state jurisdiction issues under the FPA. That is in part because “hard cases
make bad law”6—electrical energy often produces tough factual scenarios
that do not fit neatly into Commerce Clause jurisprudence.7 Courts should
consider avoiding constitutional analysis wherever a court can rule on 
other legal grounds.8  This Article also focuses on federal-state jurisdiction
under the FPA instead of the Commerce Clause for the following reasons: 
4. E.g., GREGORY NEMET ET AL., SOURCES OF PRICE DISPERSION IN U.S. RESIDENTIAL 
SOLAR INSTALLATIONS (2017), http://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/nemet_et_ 
al_pv_price_dispersion_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQV7-EADT] (analyzing price disparities
of the seemingly homogenous good of photovoltaic installations and impacts thereof on
current and future adoption of residential solar).
 5.  E.g., Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2016, FRANKFURT SCH.-
UNEP CTR. FOR CLIMATE & SUSTAINABLE FIN. (2016), https://www.actu-environnement.com/ 
media/pdf/news-26477-rapport-pnue-enr.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7MJ-FYR7].
 6.  See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“Great cases like hard cases make bad law.”).
 7.  See North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 926 (8th Cir. 2016) (Murphy, J., 
concurring) (“This case can be resolved by a preemption analysis that avoids the complex 
issues surrounding an application of the extraterritoriality doctrine to the electricity
markets . . .”). E.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 210–11
(1964) (explaining Southern California Edison’s sale of energy to the City of  Colton,  
California for the city to resell was a sale for resale which constituted a wholesale sale
under the FPA. Although the sale occurred entirely within California’s borders, it was a 
wholesale sale, so it fell under FERC’s jurisdiction according to the FPA). 
 8.  See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (“The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it. It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case . . . if a case can
be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.”).
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the FPA’s creation supports such analysis;9 the persuasive preemption 
analysis arguments advanced in Heydinger;10 and the lack of thorough FPA 
preemption analyses by commentators in comparison to that for the Commerce 
Clause.11 
The FPA originated from a judicial recognition of the federal government’s
need to provide a regulatory framework for energy markets within its 
jurisdiction. In early twentieth century Supreme Court jurisprudence, the 
Court exposed the Attleboro gap in federal energy regulation.12  The Court
recognized in Attleboro that a state regulator could not regulate the price 
paid by a utility company operating in another state because doing so 
would unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce13—such a sale was 
within the federal government’s jurisdiction. However, no regulations 
existed in 1927 to distinguish jurisdictional boundaries of state and federal 
regulation in the energy sector; thus, the regulatory (i.e., Attleboro) gap.  
To fill this void, Congress enacted the FPA shortly after the Court decided
Attleboro, effectively codifying a cooperative federalism structure that
protected the state’s traditional authority. However, the FPA also created
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The FPA delegated
to FERC jurisdiction over wholesale sales, but it permitted states to govern 
retail and all other non-wholesale electricity sales. While this wholesale versus 
retail jurisdictional divide remains, its application in modern markets  is  
still subject to debate.
In 2016, federal courts issued decisions in Heydinger (8th Circuit), Hughes
and Electric Power Supply Association (Supreme Court).14 These cases
9.  Namely, this is explained by the Attleboro gap, which is elaborated upon in the 
subsequent paragraph of the text. 
10. See Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 923, 929 (Murphy, J., concurring) (Colloton, J., 
concurring) (supporting FPA analysis over Commerce Clause).
11. Commentators often cite Heydinger as a case that debates preemption versus 
Dormant Commence Clause analysis, and the literature is limited as to streamlined analyses of
the preemption issues. E.g., Tessa Gellersen, Extraterritoriality and the Electric Grid: 
North Dakota v. Heydinger, A Case Study for the State Energy Regulation, 41 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 563 (2017) (discussing Justice Colloton’s concurring opinion in Heydinger
concluding the Clean Air Act preempted Minnesota’s statute).
12. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2002) (referencing Pub. Util. Comm’n of
Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1927)); FERC at the
Supreme Court: Drawing the Line Between Federal and State Jurisdiction Over Electric Power
Markets, MARTEN L. (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/ 20160323-
ferc-jurisdiction-electric-power-markets [https://perma.cc/H9YED6A8].
13. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1927)
(holding Rhode Island Commission’s order placed a direct burden over interstate commerce
while also noting these interstate rates could only be regulated under powers vested to
Congress, suggesting no such power had been exercised).
14. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016); Hughes v. Talen 
Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S.
Ct. 760 (2016). 
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represent a recent discussion of federal-versus-state jurisdictional boundaries
in the energy sector; in fact, a difficult discussion that could use additional
guidance.15 Questioning from the justices during the oral argument in
Electric Power Supply Association indicates a desire for clarity of the 
jurisdictional designation of wholesale and retail energy markets.16 Heydinger
produced some controversy as to its impact on energy federalism, so it 
appeared to leave the Justices with scarce answers for the Court’s decision 
in Electric Power Supply Association. This Article aims to provide a guide 
to federal-state jurisdictional analysis in the energy sector, with an eye 
toward illuminating a path forward for state climate actors. 
The Rules and Principles established in this Article are intended to
supplement the FPA’s basic jurisdictional distinction. The Rules highlight
how directly or indirectly state or federal regulators may affect wholesale
and retail markets. The Principles are meant to be read alongside the 
Rules, akin to policy considerations which accompany statutory rules.  To
illustrate the Rules and Principles, I apply them to an important climate 
change law in California. The California law is relevant because it shares
similarities with the portions of the Minnesota legislation struck down in 
Heydinger. The distinctions between these California and Minnesota laws
are also significant because, despite some similar goals amongst the bills,
California’s law has not faced a legal challenge.  For state climate actors,
it is important to understand why California’s law has stood the test of
time whilst Minnesota’s law did not. 
Though state climate actors might fear the aftermath of cases discussed
herein (as they relate to this Article’s Principles of federal regulatory creep
into the state jurisdictional realm and to FERC’s evolving role), California’s
law does not violate my Rules (i.e., there is no impermissible direct effect
on FERC regulated wholesale sales). As discussed in detail below, any
effect California’s law has on the wholesale market is permitted because 
it would be indirect. Heydinger merely provides confusion and does not 
indicate an expansion of the wholesale regulatory sphere. That said, to
15. E.g., Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 
399 (2016) (discussing claims that we are amidst a paradigm shift in the United States 
federalism model); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 
MD. L. REV. 773 (2013) (proposing dynamic federalism principles responsive to challenges 
created by federal-state interactions in energy regulation).
16. See Oral Argument at 00:45, 2:20, 12:36, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n,
136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-840 [https:// 
perma.cc/YA5B-JCCW] (providing questions from Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Roberts).
211










    
  
  
   
  
        
   
  
    
    
  
     







   




   
safeguard against potential misguidance from Heydinger, courts may 
consider giving discretion to the stated aim of the regulation or to apply a
presumption against preemption. Both alternatives provide guardrails to
help courts arrive at the correct interpretation of the jurisdiction for an 
energy regulation. 
The discussion below presents cases which provide the backdrop for the 
most recent understanding of federal-state jurisdiction under the FPA. 
Then, this paper provides Rules and Principles that emerge from these 
cases, followed by an application of the Rules and Principles to a similar
factual case in California’s Senate Bill (SB) 1368. Finally, this Article
concludes with a proposal for how state climate actors should use the
Rules as a guide and how to best utilize the Rules reach a desired—and
jurisdictionally permitted—result. 
II. THE CASES AT HAND
Several cases in 2016 concerned important climate change policy issues
related to electrical energy. The Supreme Court decided two of these cases,
Electric Power Supply Association and Hughes, and the Eighth Circuit decided
the third case, Heydinger. For the most part, these three decisions are
factually driven and might only narrowly apply to states that implement
similar climate change policy tools. Nevertheless, these cases stand as an 
important series of decisions in the recent federal-state jurisdictional tug-
of-war. Some have suggested there is a trend of federal regulatory creep
into states’ jurisdiction.17 Others may support the lines being drawn to
maintain FERC’s plenary grant of authority over wholesale energy markets.
Heydinger, Electric Power Supply Association, and Hughes are each 
significant in their own right because they illustrate judicial review  of  
noteworthy state energy policies, show circuit splits and divided appellate 
panels, and provide recent Supreme Court analysis of FPA preemption.
A. The 2016 Case Series
1. FERC v. Electric Power Supply Association (2016) (Kagan, J.)
Electric Power Supply Association is the first of two FPA cases the Supreme
Court decided in 2016. The case involved FERC Order 745, which FERC 
promulgated to clarify how demand response (DR) would function in
wholesale electrical energy auction markets and, more specifically, determine 
the formula for the clearing price of DR. DR is a practice, “in which 
operators of wholesale markets pay electricity consumers for commitments
17. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 772 (2016). 
212
KEARNEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/12/2019 10:55 AM      
 
   
  




   
    
    
    
   
     
 






    
  
    
   
     
 
  
        
   
  
   
  
    
  
        
      




[VOL. 10: 207, 2018–19] A 2017 FPA Update, Guidance, and Solution 
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
not to use power at certain times.”18 DR is submitted as a bid into a grid 
operator’s auction market—if it has a winning bid, DR will be chosen over 
other generation sources.19 
FERC issued Order 719 in 2008 as an initial address of DR participation 
in wholesale markets. Order 719 requires market operators to accept DR
bids into the market.20 From the outset, the Order retained some state 
authority over DR by allowing a, “state regulatory body to prohibit consumers 
in its retail market from taking part in wholesale demand response programs.”21 
Later, in 2011, FERC issued Order 745 to further DR participation in 
wholesale markets. Order 745 newly directed market operators on how
to price DR bids, and the order continued the policy of retaining a state 
authority carve-out.22 The Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA) 
challenged this new pricing rule, as well as the broader notion of FERC 
having any authority over DR, in its suit against FERC.23  The D.C. Circuit
agreed with EPSA, but the Supreme Court reversed and found that FERC 
properly operated within its authority.24 
The Court announced a new rule of construction for the FPA regarding
FERC’s jurisdiction and, applying this rule, construed FERC’s regulation
of DR prices to be well within FERC’s jurisdiction. The Court’s new rule 
limits FERC’s jurisdiction to rules and practices that “directly affect”
wholesale rates.25 With this finding, the Court held Order 745 precisely 
fits within FERC’s newly construed jurisdiction because DR prices directly 
affect wholesale rates.26  Because DR is bid into the auction market just
as any other wholesale supply, scheduling DR’s price directly affects the
18. Id. at 767. 
19. Id. at 769–70. The Court in Electric Power Supply Association discussed several
benefits of DR but focused on DR’s ability to improve grid reliability and reduce wholesale
prices. Id.
20. Id. at 771 (citing Order No. 719, 73 Fed. Reg. 64119, ¶ 154 (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 
35.28(g)(1) (2015))). 
21. Id. at 772. 
22. Id. at 771 (citing Order No. 745, 76 Fed. Reg. 16658 (codified at 18 C.F.R.
§ 35.28(g)(1)(v))). 
23. Id. at 780. 
24. Id. at 773. The case also dealt with a second issue: If FERC was acting within
its authority, the Court must determine whether FERC was arbitrary or capricious in creating
the rule. Id. at 782. Given this Article’s focus on jurisdictional lines, discussion of the 
second issue will be omitted.
25. Id. at 774. 
26. Id. at 774–75. 
213
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wholesale auction market.27 Thus, it is within FERC’s authority to regulate 
wholesale rates and grid reliability.
The Court also discussed why the DR price formula was not a regulation 
of retail sales. The FPA protects traditional areas of state regulation 
because it preserves state regulatory authority over retail rates.28  The  
Court explained that, “FERC cannot take an action transgressing that limit
no matter how direct, or dramatic, its impact on wholesale rates.”29 Here, 
the Court further held FERC did not transgress that line.30 Though the
Court recognized some wholesale rules naturally affect retail rates, it provided, 
“[w]hen FERC regulates what takes place on the wholesale market, as part 
of carrying out its charge to improve how that market runs, then no matter 
the effect on retail rates, [section] 824(b) imposes no bar.”31  The Court
determined that such was the case in Electric Power Supply Association. 
Justice Scalia dissented in this case and distinguished a notable point.  
Scalia argued the Court inverted the question at issue and looked to see if
DR was not retail, rather than determining if it was wholesale.32  This is
significant because, under the FPA, retail and “any other sale of electric 
energy” that is not wholesale is reserved for state authority.33  Scalia  
argued DR should be viewed as “any other sale” because it is not a sale for 
resale and thus does not meet the FPA’s definition for wholesale energy.34 
Moreover, Scalia argued DR is a retail electrical sale because DR 
participants are retail customers, and DR incentivizes retail users to curb 
their demand.35 In effect, DR participants must consider added costs to 
participating in the retail market, which is the opportunity cost of choosing
not to bid their DR.36 
27. Id. at 774. 
28. Id. at 775 (citing FPA 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 776. 
31. Id.
32. Id. at 785 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
33. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)). 
34. Id. at 785–86 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824(d)). See also id. at 786 (“For FERC’s 
regulatory authority over electric-energy sales depends not on which ‘market’ the
‘transactions occu[r] on’ . . . but rather on the identity of the putative purchaser. If the 
purchaser is one who resells electric energy to other customers, the transaction is one ‘at
wholesale’ and thus within FERC’s authority. If not, then not. Or so, at least, says the
statute.”).
35. Id. at 786. 
36. Id.
214
KEARNEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/12/2019 10:55 AM      
 




   
  






    
      
  
    
  
    
 
 
    
 
    
  
   
   
 
      
     
       
     
   
  
       
     
   
  
   
  
 
[VOL. 10: 207, 2018–19] A 2017 FPA Update, Guidance, and Solution 
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
2. Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC (2016) (Ginsburg, J.)
After Electric Power Supply Association, the Supreme Court decided 
another FPA case in 2016, regarding the permissibility of a state regulation.
In Hughes, Maryland created a unique scheme for promoting new in-state 
generation.37 However, this created the issue of whether the scheme interfered 
with the FERC’s authority over the auction market. The Court in Hughes
found such an interference, so the Court struck down Maryland’s scheme 
because it disregarded wholesale rates and required generators’ wholesale
market participation.38 
To be sure, Maryland experiences electrical grid congestion, as the  
Northeastern United States is the most densely populated region in  the  
country.39  Maryland thus felt the need to address the issue and attempted 
to increase its in-state electrical energy supply.40 The state petitioned FERC
to strengthen rules designed to help and encourage new generators entering 
the wholesale market.41 However, FERC rejected Maryland’s proposed
rules because, in FERC’s view, the proposal would create unfair incentives
for new entrants.42 Still concerned with congestion, the Maryland Public
Service Commission (PSC) issued an order to solicit a project intended to
increase in-state generation.43 
The Maryland PSC’s Generation Order solicited bids to win a state-backed 
contract for new generation: 
37. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1292 (2016). 
38. Id. at 1299. 
39. See Jamie Smith Hopkins, Power Plants Coming to Power-Hungry Region, 
BALTIMORE SUN (July 13, 2014), http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-maryland- 
power-plants-20140713-story.html [https://perma.cc/H9G2-D58U?type=image] (“Under 
the system run by multistate grid manager PJM Interconnection, the [Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co.] territory paid about $90 million in ‘congestion’ charges each of the last two 
years . . . These charges are part of the reason that [Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.] and
Pepco customers who buy electricity from their utility are paying over 20 percent more for 
that supply this summer than customers of Potomac Edison in Western Maryland, beyond
the point of transmission congestion.”). 
40. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1294. 
41. See id. (explaining Maryland’s proposal that FERC alter its New Entry Price
Adjustment, which guaranteed some new generators a stable capacity price for their first 
three years, to instead apply for ten years). 
42. Id. at 1294. 
43. Id.; Robert Walton, What the Hughes v. Talen Supreme Court Decision Means
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Unlike a traditional bilateral contract for capacity, the contract for differences
does not transfer ownership of capacity from [the generator] to [the load serving
entities]. Instead [under the contract for differences,]  [the  generator] sells its
capacity on the PJM market, but Maryland’s program guarantees [the generator]
the contract price rather than the auction clearing price.44 
This meant the generator, CPV, would bid its electrical energy into the auction 
market but take the price it contracted for with Maryland, regardless of 
the clearing price at auction. Still, Maryland stands to gain or lose any
difference between the clearing price and contracted price.45 The Maryland
PSC eventually selected a generation project,46 but other pre-existing generators 
allegedly harmed by the project brought an action against the PSC, thus 
initiating the Hughes litigation.47 
In affirming the lower courts’ decisions to strike down the contract for 
differences, the Supreme Court found, “Maryland’s program set[] an interstate
wholesale rate, contravening the FPA’s division of authority between state 
and federal regulators.”48 The Court explained FERC’s plenary authority 
over the auction market49 and concluded the pre-approved clearing price
inherently meets FERC’s duty to set rates that are “just and reasonable.”50 
Maryland’s contract for differences set a wholesale price independent of 
the wholesale auction clearing price and thus impermissibly invaded FERC’s 
purview regulatory. The Court in Hughes warned that states do not have 
authority to second-guess FERC jurisdictional rates—Congress’s plenary
grant of power to FERC over the wholesale rates left no room for such
state action.51 
The end of the Hughes decision provided a key phrase for the states in
the energy market realm. While emphasizing the limited scope of this
decision, Justice Ginsburg ensured states of the broad latitude they have
in policymaking, so long as their energy policies are, “untethered to
a generator’s wholesale market participation.”52 Specifically, Justice Ginsburg 
referenced policy tools available to states to encourage new and clean
44. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1295 (emphasis added). Maryland is a part of the PJM
Interconnection, a regional transmission organization (RTO) that coordinates the movement
and sales of wholesale electricity in all or parts of various states in the greater mid-Atlantic and
mid-West region. Who We Are, PJM INTERCONNECTION, http://www.pjm.com/about-
pjm/who-we-are.aspx [https://perma.cc/TSW9-7YFC] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). 
45. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1295. 
46. CPV Maryland, LLC, submitted the winning bid. 
47. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1296. The named party in the suit was W. Kevin Hughes,
the Chairman of the Maryland PSC. 
48. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016). 
49. Id. at 1298. 
50. Id. at 1297. 
51. Id. at 1298. 
52. Id. at 1299. 
216
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generation beyond the scope of the Hughes decision, including, “tax incentives, 
land grants, direct subsidies, [and] construction of state-owned generation 
facilities.”53 
Notably, Justice Sotomayor joined the majority but also wrote a concurring 
opinion to clarify guiding federal preemption principles.54 Although her 
points appear more cautionary than substantive, they are nonetheless valuable 
for federal-state energy jurisdiction. Justice Sotomayor cautioned courts 
to be careful not to confuse “the ‘congressionally designed interplay between
state and federal regulation’ for impermissible tension that requires preemption
under the Supremacy Clause.”55 
3. North Dakota v. Heydinger (8th Circuit 2016) 
Heydinger is a contentious Eighth Circuit case.56  It followed Electric
Power Supply Association and Hughes and thus provided immediate insight
into how circuits courts might interpret similar cases.  For those who see 
Electric Power Supply Association and Hughes as part of an expansion of 
federal regulatory reach in the energy sector, Heydinger supports this view.57 
Regardless of the existence of such a trend, the case illustrated an overstep
of state authority after the court struck down a Minnesota climate change
mitigation policy. Doctrinally, the Eighth Circuit’s analysis in Heydinger
also highlights the debate on whether to decide a case on preemption or 
dormant Commerce Clause grounds. Still, the case does not clearly resolve
the debate. Nonetheless, after the dust settled, FPA preemption carried the
day in Heydinger to both gain support of the panel’s majority and to produce
a holding.
Heydinger concerned a Minnesota law called the Next Generation Energy 
Act of 2007 (NGEA).58 The Eighth Circuit panel reviewed a section of the
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1300 (quoting Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of
Kan., 489 U.S. 493 (1989)).
56. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016). See Todd L. Lundy,
The False Analogies of Electricity, and Toward an Analysis of Contractual Relationships 
to Differentiate Transactions Among States Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 11
TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 31, 66, 72–73 (2016); Gellersen, supra note 11. 
57. E.g., FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 787 (2016) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
58. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 915–16 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 216H.03, subd. 3 (West 2017)). 
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NGEA which stated “no person shall. . . (2) import or commit to import 
from outside the state power from a new large energy facility that would 
contribute to statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions; or (3) 
enter into a new long-term power purchase agreement that would increase
statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions.”59 Three non-profit
cooperatives comprised of small rural utilities challenged these two provisions. 
They claimed Minnesota’s law impermissibly impacted their wholesale
activities in other states.60 
Both the district court and Eighth Circuit agreed with the cooperatives 
and struck down the Minnesota law. However, four judges that rendered
decisions in the case and were split in their reasoning. Understandably,
the plurality in reasoning only added to existing confusion in this case.
The district court found the provisions violated the extraterritoriality doctrine
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence and were thus per se invalid state laws.61 
Judge Locken, the author of the Eighth Circuit’s main decision, agreed with
the lower court’s extraterritoriality decision.62 However, the two remaining
judges on the Eighth Circuit panel, Judge Colloton and Judge Murphy, 
disagreed and instead ruled on preemption grounds.63 Although the two
agreeing Eighth Circuit judges form a majority opinion based on preemption,
each wrote after Judge Locken, indicating they concurred with Judge Locken’s 
opinion. To further confuse the matter, while Judge Colloton agreed with 
Judge Murphy’s FPA preemption analysis, he also found preemption under 
the Clean Air Act.64  The main Heydinger decision thus stems from agreement
between two out of three circuit judges in finding the FPA preempted
Minnesota’s law. Unfortunately, the court spent much of the decision on
the debate over the determinative doctrine, so there is ample discussion of 
the statute under FPA preemption. 
For Judge Murphy, Heydinger turned on the Minnesota law’s outright
ban on wholesale sales.65  She reasoned: 
59. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 216H.03, subd. 3(2)-(3) (West 2017). 
60.  Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 913–14. 
61. Id.
62. Id. at 921–22. 
63. Id. at 927 (Murphy, J. concurring); id. at 929 (Colloton, J., concurring). 
64. Id. at 928 (Colloton, J., concurring). This Heydinger discussion focuses on FPA
preemption due to this Article’s focus on FPA preemption and because the majority vote
in this case actually comes from FPA preemption. Clean Air Act preemption and a Dormant
Commerce Clause violation each only received one vote of support from the Eighth
Circuit panel. Both rationales will only be referenced herein to further the discussion 
surrounding FPA preemption.
65. Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 926–27 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
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[s]ince the import provision bans contracts for power from new large power plants, it
thus bans wholesale sales of electric energy in interstate commerce. The FPA
“leaves no room either for direct state regulation of the prices of interstate
wholesales” or for regulation that “would indirectly achieve the same result.”66 
According to Judge Murphy, Minnesota’s ban on certain wholesale sales
is a state regulation of wholesale sales that directly conflicts with FERC’s 
jurisdiction over wholesale rates,67 a fatal finding under FPA preemption
analysis.68 
Judge Colloton’s view is just as important as Judge Murphy’s in forming 
Eighth Circuit FPA preemption precedent here because both concurrences
are necessary to form a majority in this case.  Judge Colloton agreed with 
Judge Murphy’s point regarding the fundamental flaw of the provisions—
the fact the law bans wholesale sales.69  In Judge Colloton’s words, “[b]ecause 
a State may not regulate wholesale rates, it follows that a State may not 
impose a complete ban on wholesale sales, effectively forbidding the parties 
to arrive at any mutually agreeable price.”70 Moreover, Judge Colloton
addressed the breadth of the statute. Minnesota argued for a narrower
interpretation that, “applies only to bilateral contracts in which a Minnesota 
entity agrees to purchase power from an out-of-state energy provider.”71 
In response, Judge Colloton noted that Minnesota would be preempted, 
even under the narrow construction argued by Minnesota. Judge Colloton 
appeared to reason that regardless of how encompassing of entities the
statute is, a state may never impose a complete ban on wholesale sales.72 
This bodes poorly for those who think a more state-friendly reading of the
statute would have been sufficient for Minnesota to succeed.
B. What Do These Cases Mean? 
Even with the three aforementioned Federal High Court decisions
regarding the federal-state jurisdictional line in the energy sector, there 
does not appear to be sufficient guidance for future courts to answer similar
jurisdictional questions. Electric Power Supply Association attempted to 
66. Id. at 926 (Murphy, J., concurring) (quoting FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n,
136 S. Ct. 760, 780 (2016)). 
67. Id. at 926–27 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
68. Id. at 927 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
69. Id. at 928 (Colloton, J., concurring). 
70. Id.
71. Id. at 927. 
72. Id. at 928. 
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clarify the line when the Court announced a new rule of construction 
limiting FERC’s regulatory authority over wholesale energy sales. Although
this case appeared to provide some help, the Supreme Court decided
Hughes later that same year and did not apply the Electric Power Supply 
Association test.  The Hughes decision, compounded with the disheveled 
aftermath of Heydinger, left unresolved questions and arguably made 
it more difficult for courts to decide issues of regulatory jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, Heydinger may be especially problematic for states with 
similar regulations such as California.73  The  Heydinger court opinions
discussed the flaw in the Minnesota provision as if it was an inherent flaw, 
but the comparable law in California has gone a decade without a legal
challenge.74 
There are different ways to coalesce the 2016 case series. One can interpret 
the cases narrowly to provide answers to specific factual scenarios: DR 
pricing is FERC jurisdictional; state regulations tethered to wholesale market
participation violate FERC’s jurisdiction; and state bans on wholesale sales
are regulations of the wholesale price which the FPA preempts. However,
many will look to the 2016 cases for much more than those simple answers. 
Because a big picture understanding could provide crucial for regulatory 
effectiveness, it is key to identify common threads that run through these
cases.
III. EMERGING RULES AND PRINCIPLES FROM THE 
THREE CASE SERIES 
In just one year, all three of these significant opinions were issued to 
address the core jurisdictional issue facing energy regulators. Nonetheless, 
we are left without a clear determination of the boundary between federal
and state regulators. This section synthesizes succinct Rules and Principles 
that can be extrapolated from the aforementioned cases, in the absence of 
a clear boundary from the courts. Overall, the 2016 cases highlight the
directness with which regulators can affect markets inside or outside their 
jurisdiction, FERC’s evolving role in the increasingly complex and 
interconnected wholesale energy market, and FPA’s preemption of state 
action. 
A. Rules of Directness: The Effect Regulations May Have on Markets
The courts in Electric Power Supply Association, Hughes, and Heydinger
discussed how direct a regulation may impact prices or rates through references
73. See discussion of S.B. 1368 (Stats. 2006, Ch. 598), infra Section IV(A). 
74. How California would fare against legal challenge is discussed in Section IV.
220
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to “direct” and “indirect” effects. These discussions formed holdings in each 
case but did not provide a concrete understanding of the reach a regulatory
effect has on markets. Thus, the Rules of Directness below address the
spectrum of effects regulators might have on markets.
To elaborate on the direct versus indirect effects, consider a hypothetical 
state public utility commission aiming to create a retail rate program that 
lowers prices for certain retail customers. This regulation would be a
direct effect on retail prices. In contrast, if FERC assessed new fees on
coal-powered electricity generators bidding into ISO/RTO auction markets, 
there would be a direct effect on wholesale markets. However, markets
are necessarily interconnected. In each hypothetical, one could imagine 
the ways in which a regulation impacts the market it was not intended to 
impact—retail rate regulations could affect the wholesale market and vice 
versa, even if the unintended effect on the market is only indirect. 
The distinction between direct and indirect effects does not exclude
regulations that actually regulate the market rates, as opposed to regulations 
that merely affect rates. The Rules herein fold actual rate regulations into 
regulations that directly affect rates.  This means Rules which apply to direct 
effects also apply to actual affects because the directness Rules equally 
constrain regulations that directly affect price and those which actually regulate 
price.  The Court’s analysis in Hughes supports this, as the Court determined 
Maryland actually set wholesale rates,75 even though the Court cited to multiple
decisions that considered regulatory effects.76 Although Maryland’s contract 
for differences in Hughes constituted actual rate setting, the FPA preempted
it just as it would a state regulation that tethered itself to the wholesale market
in a way that directly affected the wholesale market. Thus, this Article 
intertwines the discussion of regulations with actual effects and those with
direct effects, with a focus on direct and indirect effects on markets. 
75. See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016) (“We
agree with the Fourth Circuit’s judgment that Maryland’s program sets an interstate wholesale
rate, contravening the FPA’s division of authority between state and federal regulators.”). 
76. See Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1296–98 (citing FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n,
136 S. Ct. 760 (2016); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 370
(1988); Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015)).  In  Oneok, while 
discussing the FPA’s sister legislation, the Natural Gas Act, the Court stated, “[w]here, as
here, a practice affects nonjurisdictional as well as jurisdictional sales, pre-emption can be 
found only where a detailed examination convincingly demonstrates that a matter falls 
within the pre-empted field as defined by this Court’s precedents. Those precedents
emphasize the importance of considering the target at which the state-law claims aim.”
Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1592. 
221




   






     
  
   
   
  






   
 
 
   
  
   
   
  




   
 
 
     
   
Whether a regulation has a direct or indirect effect on a market applies 
to both state and federal regulations for either retail or wholesale markets.
In the hypothetical regulations mentioned above, the first scenario involves a
state regulation on retail markets, and the second scenario concerns a federal
regulation on wholesale markets. Because the Rules consider both hypothetical 
situations, they account for both direct and indirect effects that both state 
and federal regulators may have on the market. 
There are a finite number of scenarios available to test how “direct” a
regulation effects a market. This is arguably beneficial because it provides 
an exhaustive list of how an energy regulation may impact a given market.
There are three factors, each with two possibilities, which, as described
below, allows for eight possible scenarios to test the impacts of direct
regulations. The first factor is the regulating body, which is either state
or federal; the second factor is directness of effect, which is either direct
or indirect; and the third factor is the affected market in question and is 
either a wholesale or retail market. The eight Rules are extrapolations 
from the recent case law discussed above in Section II and are formulated 
to determine whether the particular regulatory effect is in accordance with
the jurisdictional parameters set out in both the FPA and judicial decisions.
EIGHT RULES OF DIRECTNESS
1. FERC regulations may directly affect the wholesale market; 
2. FERC regulations may not regulate outside its explicit jurisdictional
boundary for the purpose of indirectly affecting wholesale markets; 
3. FERC regulations may not directly affect the retail market; 
4. FERC regulations may indirectly regulate the retail market; 
5. State regulators may not directly affect wholesale markets;
6. State regulators may indirectly affect wholesale markets; 
7. State regulators may directly affect retail markets; and
8. State regulators may indirectly affect retail markets.
Should future confusion arise from application of these Rules, it is likely 
due to mislabeling an effect as direct or indirect. Indirect effects have causal
steps that stand between the regulation and the affected market (i.e., the 
regulation does not target the particular impact, or impacts, realized). In
contrast, direct effects involve a directly linked cause and effect, such that 
the regulation aims to impact the affected market. Although direct effects
can be confused for meaningful or strong effects, how substantial an effect
is does not bear on its directness. Rather, directness speaks to the causal 
link of an effect. Whether a regulation and effect are directly or indirectly 
related could result in a very noteworthy impact or be entirely unimportant, 
222
KEARNEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/12/2019 10:55 AM      
 
   
  
    
 
  
   
  
  
   
  
   
  




   










     
  
   
     
   
   
       
  
[VOL. 10: 207, 2018–19] A 2017 FPA Update, Guidance, and Solution 
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
but that does not determine its proper jurisdiction or the legality of the 
regulation.
1. Rules 1 and 2: FERC Regulations with Effects on the  
Wholesale Market 
1. FERC regulations may directly affect the wholesale market; and 
2. FERC regulations may not regulate outside its explicit jurisdictional 
boundary for the purpose of indirectly affecting wholesale markets. 
Electric Power Supply Association was the Court’s first decision of the
2016 cases discussed herein, and the opinion’s “direct effects” language 
was later cited to in the two subsequent decisions.77 The case elaborates
on FERC’s jurisdictional limitations on regulating the wholesale market.78 
As a federal agency tasked with regulating wholesale energy markets, 
FERC is an ideal exemplar to demonstrate how Rules 1 and 2 exhibit the 
natural limits on administrative agencies. Agencies must work within their 
sector to affect the sector, and they cannot step outside the sector to indirectly
affect change.
In Electric Power Supply Association, the Court stated that FERC has
authority to regulate in ways that affect wholesale rates.79  The Court then
clarified the extent of this authority and adopted a new rule of construction 
that limits, “FERC’s ‘affecting’ jurisdiction to rules or practices that ‘directly
affect the [wholesale] rate.’”80 Thus, Rule 1 is a comfortable assertion with
approval from our highest court.81 
However, the Court excluded indirect effects as a regulatory means for
FERC to affect the wholesale market—hence Rule 2. If FERC regulated 
to indirectly affect wholesale markets, FERC would need to create a
regulation beyond the scope of its inherent wholesale regulatory duties.
In other words, FERC would need to devise an otherwise unsanctioned
way to affect the wholesale market.  For example, suppose FERC tried to 
regulate a congressional tax break for certain energy producers with a tax 
77. See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016); North 
Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 926 (8th Cir. 2016) (Murphy, J., concurring).
78. E.g., FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767–68 (2016). 
79. Id. at 774 (“That means FERC has the authority—and, indeed, the duty—to ensure
that rules or practices ‘affecting’ wholesale rates are just and reasonable.”). 
80. Id.
81. See id. at 784–85 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (showing support for the rule concerning 
direct affects while disagreeing with the majority’s view to the contrary). 
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that alters generators’ competitiveness in wholesale markets. Here, FERC 
would not have authority to directly regulate taxes because it would indirectly
affect the wholesale electrical energy market.  FERC’s authority does not 
extend that far, and it is constrained to regulatory rules and practices that
directly affect wholesale rates.82 The inverse of Rules 1 and 2 is true for
FERC in the retail market, which leads to Rules 3 and 4. 
2. Rules 3 and 4: FERC Regulations Affecting Retail Markets 
3. FERC regulations may not directly affect the retail market; and
4. FERC regulations may indirectly regulate the retail market. 
FERC regulations may only indirectly affect retail rates.  Rules 3 and 4
occupy an area where the Court occasionally waivers in its consistent 
analysis of regulatory effects and perhaps demonstrates why there is a 
disconnect between the Court’s 2016 decisions and the Justices’ yearning
for more clarity as to guiding rules. Nonetheless, by focusing on an affects
analysis, implicit support for Rules 3 and 4 can be found in the Court’s 
use of contrasting language to show a meaningful limitation of FERC in 
retail markets. 
FERC may indirectly affect retail rates, and Rule 4 reflects this.  The Court
in Electric Power Supply Association noted, “FERC regulation does not run
afoul of [the FPA’s jurisdictional] proscription just because it affects— 
even substantially—the quantity or terms of retail sales.”83  The Court went
so far as to say there is “no legal consequence” to FERC for any regulatory
effect on the retail market when the regulation is dealing with the wholesale 
market.84 This gives FERC considerable leeway to regulate the wholesale
market.
However, this explanation contrasts with the strict limitation prohibiting 
FERC from directly affecting the retail market.85  The FPA limits FERC’s
jurisdiction to the wholesale market, reserving regulatory authority over
retail sales to the states.86  The Court in Electric Power Supply Association
stated, “FERC cannot take an action transgressing that limit no matter how 
direct, or dramatic, its impact on wholesale rates.”87 This language restrains
82. Id. at 775. 
83. Id. at 776. 
84. See id. (“When FERC sets a wholesale rate, when it changes wholesale market
224
rules, when it allocates electricity as between wholesale purchasers—in short, when it 
takes virtually any action respecting wholesale transactions—it has some effect, in either 
the short or the long term, on retail rates. That is of no legal consequence.”). 
85. Id. at 775. See also 16 U.S.C. § 824(b). 
86. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 775 (2016) (referencing FPA section 
824(b)).
87. Id.
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the broad language of the previous paragraph by showing FERC may not 
regulate endlessly in the name of the wholesale market. Because FERC 
can regulate wholesale markets, even when a regulation indirectly effects
the retail market, this contrasting directive implies that FERC regulations 
which more directly affect the retail market transgress the state’s jurisdictional 
authority.  Thus, Rule 3 bans FERC from directly affecting the retail market.
Rule 3 is further supported by the practical requirements of Rule 2 because 
a FERC regulation directed at the retail market exceeds the explicit 
jurisdictional boundary of wholesale markets. Even if FERC did this to
have some impact on the wholesale market, such a run-around regulation
of the wholesale market is prohibited under Rule 2. Any FERC regulation 
directly affecting the retail market is likely to violate Rule 2, thus supporting
Rule 3 and its prohibition of FERC’s direct effects on the retail market. 
3. Rules 5 and 6: State Regulations Affecting Wholesale Markets 
5. State regulators may not directly affect wholesale markets; and
6. State regulators may indirectly affect wholesale markets. 
Although FERC is the FPA’s focal point,88 the statute nonetheless references
state regulations. Given that the wholesale market is strictly within FERC’s
jurisdiction, states may not directly affect the wholesale market. However, 
because Congress is cognizant of the interconnectedness of the retail and
wholesale markets, the FPA permits states to regulate in ways that indirectly
affect the wholesale market. In short, the FPArecognizes a systemof cooperative
federalism by delegating some authority to FERC and retaining the rest 
for states.89 In Hughes, Justice Sotomayor cautioned, “courts must be careful 
not to confuse the ‘congressionally designed interplay between state and
federal regulation,’ for impermissible tension that requires preemption
under the Supremacy Clause.”90 Accordingly, states may only indirectly
affect wholesale markets as they operate in a cooperative middle ground 
with FERC. As Justice Scalia discussed in Electric Power Supply Association,
though FERC has sole jurisdictional authority over DR rate scheduling, 
states may opt-out of the DR program altogether.91 
88. See 16 U.S.C. § 824. 
89. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 785 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 16 
U.S.C. §§ 824(a)-(b)(1)). 
90. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1300 (2016) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (internal citation omitted).
91. See supra text accompanying note 100. 
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FERC’s jurisdiction over the wholesale market is intended to be plenary,
and thus states cannot directly affect it.92 Justice Kagan made this clear
in Electric Power Supply Association when she stated, “[t]he FPA ‘leaves
no room either for direct state regulation of the prices of interstate
wholesales’ or for regulation that ‘would indirectly achieve the same result.’”93 
Justice Ginsburg also alluded to the directness of regulatory effect in Hughes, 
but instead used the term “tethered.”94 There, Justice Ginsburg explained 
states may regulate “through measures ‘untethered to . . . wholesale market 
participation,’”95 so only those with an indirect effect on the wholesale market
were permissible under the FPA.96 As such, Maryland should have untethered 
its regulations to the wholesale market. By failing to do so, Maryland violated 
the FPA because its regulations directly affected the wholesale market.97 
Despite the strong prohibition of state regulations on wholesale markets,
states regulations may indirectly affect wholesale markets. Justice Kagan’s 
statement in Electric Power Supply Association98 may appear expressly 
contradictory to this, but one must draw a fine line in the Justice’s statement
to show no contradiction to Rule 6’s allowance of state indirect effects on
wholesale markets. Justice Kagan references direct state regulations, not 
regulations with direct effects. She adds indirectness to the statement as
well, but again, she is not referencing indirect effects. Justice Kagan’s 
statement instead relates to Rule 2 regarding direct regulations of things 
outside the energy regulatory realm that secondarily impact rates (e.g.
directly regulating taxes, which directly or indirectly affects the energy 
market). State “regulation[s] that ‘would indirectly achieve the same result’” 
as a direct state regulation of wholesale price would be like a state tax that
directly regulates wholesale prices.99 This is because it is a direct state
regulation of taxes that indirectly achieves the goal of altering wholesale
prices, just not through effects. Rather, the tax break achieves the goal of 
altering wholesale prices by directly addressing a feature of wholesale rates.
Therefore, Justice Kagan’s statement prohibiting states from indirectly
regulating the wholesale market does not extend to indirectly affecting the
wholesale market. Rather, she prohibits direct regulations, regardless of
their intent. 
92. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298. 
93. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 780. 
94. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299. 
95. Id.
96. Something tethered is “attached” and thus directly connected or affected. See
Tether, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tether 
[https://perma.cc/54FV-5VFT].
97. See supra text accompanying notes 48–51. 
98. See supra text accompanying note 93.
99. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 780. 
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Although there are clear grants of plenary authority between the state
and FERC, this authority operates within a cooperative federalism model.  
As such, there is a middle ground in which states and FERC permissibly 
operate. This “middle ground” encompasses the area in which states may 
indirectly affect the wholesale market. Justice Kagan did not intend to strike 
down state actions in this realm, and the Court approved such actions in
Electric Power Supply Association. If indirect effects were not permitted,
the results may be ridiculous, given the interconnectedness of the respective 
markets.
The Court’s recognition of states’ ability to indirectly affect the wholesale
market comports with the way courts have looked at state jurisdictional
authority. For example, in Electric Power Supply Association, FERC’s 
DR price formula was the wholesale price component of DR. However, 
FERC also respected states ability to regulate DR, as shown by FERC 
providing states the power to opt out of DR.100 DR prices are within FERC’s
jurisdiction because they are bid into the wholesale market and affect
wholesale prices—in that they intend to drive down wholesale prices.101 
However, when a state removes itself from a scheme that is intended to lower 
wholesale prices, such removal effects on wholesale prices. Nevertheless,
the Court in Electric Power Supply Association showed no concern for 
FERC allowing states to regulate in this way and instead viewed the effect
on wholesale prices as only indirect and, thus, permissible.102 
A rule disallowing states to indirectly affect the retail capacity market 
would risk absurd results. As Justice Kagan stated, “[i]t is a fact of economic 
life that the wholesale and retail markets in electricity, as in every other 
known product, are not hermetically sealed from each other. To the contrary,
transactions that occur on the wholesale market have natural consequences at
the retail level.”103 Yet, courts permit FERC regulations with indirect effects
on the retail market because regulating these interconnected markets have 
naturally relational consequences.104 It must therefore be true that a state’s
regulation of the retail market is not prohibited because of its indirect
100. Id. at 789 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that FERC . . . is willing to let
[s]tates opt out of its demand-response scheme serves to highlight just how far the rule 
intrudes into the retail electricity market.”).
101. Id. at 775. 
102. See id. at 774. 
103. Id. at 776. 
104. Id. See also supra Section III.A.2 (discussing Rules 3 (“FERC regulations may
not directly affect the retail market”) and 4 (“FERC regulations may indirectly regulate 
the retail market”)).
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effect on the wholesale market. Courts do not apply a strict scrutiny review
standard for regulatory retail rate schedules to determine whether the regulations 
and associated rate schedules alter wholesale prices. An indirect effect
may include countless causal steps between the retail regulation and wholesale
price. Thus, some indirect effects must be permitted to avoid the absurdity
that would result from barring all retail regulations that impact wholesale
prices.
In the absence of demonstrable distinction amongst regulations that 
create indirect effects, it appears state actions with indirect effects on the
wholesale market are and will subsist as a natural, acceptable component
part of cooperative federalism—at least in the capacity market realm.
Based on the aforementioned analysis, we know courts do not ask how
indirect the effect is. Because courts do not count causal steps between a
state regulation and a measured affect in the market, it remains to be seen 
how a regulation may indirectly affect the markets in a “permissible” way.
For now, at least, a state may indirectly affect the wholesale market, 
regardless of how indirect the effect is.
4. Rules 7 and 8: State Regulations Affecting Retail Markets
1. State regulators may directly affect retail markets; and
2. State regulators may indirectly affect retail markets.
The final two Rules of Directness show the area in which states have
the most latitude: retail markets and any market not deemed wholesale.105 
States may both directly and indirectly affect retail markets. States have 
broad police powers limited only by constitutional constraints and other
recognized limits in federalism. In the energy sector, the FPA specifically
grants authority to FERC, whereas the FPA recognizes the broad authority
states have over retail markets and, “any other sale[s] of electric energy . . . .”106 
Again, the allowance for states to affect retail markets or “any other sale 
of electric energy” that is not wholesale would exclude other explicit
prohibitions, such as a prohibition on states directly regulating wholesale 
markets.
Rule 8 allows states to indirectly regulate retail rates and thus illustrates 
the area wherein states and FERC Rules conflict.  Because this Article refers 
to states generally, Rule 8 encompasses state commissions and legislatures 
not confined by statutory grants to specific subject matter.  This contrasts
my references to FERC at the exclusion of Congress or Federal regulators 
105. See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 785 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
16 U.S.C. §§ 824(a)-(b)(1)). 
106.  16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). 
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broadly.  By focusing on the conflict between states and FERC, this analysis 
reflects the FPA’s jurisdictional lines more adequately than a broad federal- 
versus-state discussion. 
B. The Evolving FERC
One principle of energy regulation is the ever-evolving nature of FERC.
The Supreme Court’s recurring reference to the “evolving FERC”107 without 
similar statements about the states suggests the Court sees FERC as primarily 
regulating new innovations and disruptions in the energy market. With 
an increasingly interconnected grid, it is fair to suspect that more and more 
energy sector activity will involve FERC through wholesale effects.
Nonetheless, it is still debatable just how much weight these statements 
deserve.
The Court noted in Electric Power Supply Association and Hughes that 
the energy sector is becoming increasingly complex and interconnected.
This is followed by a comment about FERC’s evolving role in cooperative 
federalism.108 In the Court’s words, “[s]ince the FPA’s passage, electricity has
increasingly become a competitive interstate business, and FERC’s role
has evolved accordingly.”109  With so many regulatory and market forces
at play in the energy sector, and with the intersection of such forces becoming 
more apparent, it seems indisputable that FERC is evolving as a regulator 
in this dynamic field. 
Still, one may view the Court’s statements as a benign comment about
cooperative federalism. Since its creation, FERC has been discovering its
role and defining the wholesale market it regulates.110  For the same reasons, 
one could say FERC is evolving.  Though states may also evolve in their 
own regulatory sphere, there may be rhetorical significance to the Court’s
comments about FERC.
FERC’s evolution is also significant because the Court tends to rule in
FERC’s.111 Although the idea of an evolving FERC may not be controversial 
107. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 768; Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg.,
LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1292 (2016). 
108. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 768; Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1292. 
109. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1292 (quoting Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 768). 
110. E.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964) (holding
sale for resale occurring entirely intra-state is still within the Federal Power Commission’s
exclusive wholesale territory).
111. Id. See also FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016); Hughes v. 
Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). 
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on its face, some may nonetheless find this “Principle” controversial because
the Court has not yet announced an analogous evolving concept for states.
State actors may find this significant, but the next Principle discussed
below further highlights the import of this concept, including that it is in 
tandem with FERC’s evolution.
C. Federal Regulatory Creep and Why Heydinger Matters
The other Principle involves a broader view of the cases and their results. 
Courts in Electric Power Supply Association, Hughes, and Heydinger either
ruled against a state regulation112 or in favor of federal authority.113  For
state climate actors looking to be aggressive in the energy sector, these
2016 cases may be cause for concern. 
The legitimacy of such fear may hinge on whether Heydinger was
correctly decided or, alternatively, an outlier.  This is particularly true for 
those in the Eighth Circuit because they must account for Heydinger’s 
precedential value. However, it is also true for anyone in the United States 
looking for judicial trends and those looking for how circuit courts respond
to new Supreme Court decisions. The Heydinger court cited to both Electric 
Power Supply Association and Hughes, providing immediate feedback 
from one circuit as to how other circuits may interpret the two Supreme
Court cases.114 
Still, Heydinger has issues and gives reasons to question its precedential
value. The way the opinion was authored, the confusions over what holds,
and the odd mix of concurrences which outnumber the borderline de facto
majority, provide reason to question Heydinger’s authority.115  The following
section applies Rules from this Article to California law and will provide 
further analysis of Heydinger and the argument regarding the role of federal 
regulatory creep in deciding jurisdictional boundaries. This analysis has
important similarities to the Minnesota legislation struck down in Heydinger. 
112. Hughes shot down Maryland’s contract for differences, and Heydinger voided
two Minnesota provisions. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299; North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 
F.3d 912, 922 (8th Cir. 2016). 
113. The Court held in Electric Power Supply Association that demand response 
wholesale market price scheduling was FERC jurisdictional. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n,
136 S. Ct. at 784. 
114.  Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 926–28. 
115. This specifically refers to the lack of a majority in the Heydinger decision. See 
supra text accompanying notes 62–72. 
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IV. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE SECTION 8341 UNDER THE 
EMERGING PRINCIPLES AND RULES
Armed with Rules and Principles to guide analysis of the FPA’s federal-
state jurisdictional boundary, we now turn to a California code viewed
here as both a model statute that has not faced legal challenge and as a 
statute to showcase an argument. It is important for state climate actors
to observe the difference between the law in California and the Minnesota 
law struck down in Heydinger. Both states seek to reduce emissions and
broadly address GHGs on the supply-side of load serving entities (LSEs) 
in their state.116 However, only California’s Public Utilities Code Section 
8341 remains intact after the Eighth Circuit struck down Minnesota’s law
in Heydinger. 
A. Background on California’s S.B. 1368 (2006)
California’s S.B. 1368 is part of the myriad of significant climate change
legislation from the Golden State.117 Considered cutting-edge in 2006,
S.B. 1368 was the world’s first legislation to set GHG emissions performance 
116. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(a) (Deering 2019) (setting an emissions performance 
standard for electrical energy contracted for by load-serving entities); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 216H.03, subd. 3(2)-(3) (West 2017) (banning essentially all purchases that would
increase statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions). Minnesota’s law is rather
blunt with its intentions, while California’s comparable law leaves room for further
investigation to understand how tough the law’s standard would prove to be. The
law permitted coal plants to reduce emissions enough to meet the performance standard, 
but the process is largely through carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology. See
Carbon Capture Use and Storage, CTR. FOR  CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., https://www. 
c2es.org/technology/factsheet/CCS#_ednref8 (“The U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) estimates that natural gas, when used in an efficient combined cycle plant, emits less
than half as much CO2 as coal.”) [https://perma.cc/QB9P-NB6M]. When the Obama 
Administration EPA engaged in New Source Performance Standards rulemaking, it was 
said that the limit of 1400 pounds of carbon per megawatt hour (CO2/MWh) would “almost 
certainly require[]” new coal plants to employ CCS. Regulating Power Sector Carbon
Emissions  , CTR. FOR  CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/content/regulating-
231
power-sector-carbon-emissions/ [https://perma.cc/3BMG-Z4SW]. However, California
went on to adopt even tougher standards when it capped emissions at 1100 pounds 
CO2/MWh, both for POUs and LSEs. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, Interim Opinion on Phase 
1 Issues: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Performance Standard, Rulemaking (R.) 06-04-009 
(Apr. 13, 2006); CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, SB 1368 EMISSION PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/emission_standards/ [https://perma.cc/PJG3-HFDS].
117. 2006 Cal. Stat. ch. 598 (codified at PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8340–41). 
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standards for power plant investments.118 Governor Schwarzenegger signed
S.B. 1368 in 2006, effectively codifying the relevant emissions standard
in California Public Utilities Code Sections 8340 and 8341.119 
Public Utilities Code Section 8340 provides definitions and Section 8341 
provides the substance of the law. Section 8341(a) sets forth the following:
No load-serving entity or local publicly owned electric utility may enter into  a  
long-term financial commitment unless any baseload generation supplied under
the long-term financial commitment complies with the [GHGs] emission performance 
standard established by the commission, pursuant to subdivision (d), for a [LSE], or 
by the Energy Commission, pursuant to subdivision (e), for a local publicly owned 
electric utility.120 
Because California regulates public owned utilities (POUs) and LSEs
separately, both are distinctively recognized in Section 8341(a). After
clarifying that Section 8341 applies to POUs and LSEs, the Code then  
forbids both entities from entering into long-term financing commitments
that do not meet their respective performance standards. 
Section 8341(d) and (e) mandate the same emissions performance standard 
but address the LSEs and POUs separately. Subdivisions (d) and (e) require
the appropriate agency to, “establish a [GHGs] emission performance standard
for all baseload generation of [LSEs and POUs] at a rate of emissions of 
[GHGs] that is no higher than the rate of emissions of [GHGs] for 
combined-cycle natural gas baseload generation.”121 The Section required
agency proceedings to promulgate the standard, but the California Legislature 
set an emissions ceiling equal to that for combined-cycle natural gas
baseload generation. 
118. NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, California Take on Power Plant Emissions: SB 1368
Sets Groundbreaking Greenhouse Gas Performance Standard (Aug. 2007), https://www.
nrdc.org/sites/default/files/sb1368.pdf [https://perma.cc/SNJ7-VS6M].
119. California’s Legislature later amended those sections in 2008, but the 2008 
amendments were non-substantive. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8340 (Deering 2019); id. §
8341 (Deering 2019). 
120. Id. § 8341(a) (Deering 2019). 
121. Id. §§ 8341(d)-(e) (Deering 2019). The “appropriate agency” language refers
to variation as applied to agencies because LSEs and POUs are regulated differently in
California. The Energy Commission primarily oversees POUs, and the Public Utilities 
Commission primarily oversees LSEs. E.g., CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, CALIFORNIA’S ENERGY
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B. Discussion and Analysis of the California and Minnesota Laws: The 
Good, The Bad, and Weathering a Challenge 
This section first analyzes the Heydinger outcome in light of the fact 
that California has yet to experience a similar challenge, specifically by
analyzing the important differences between the California and Minnesota
statutes. Although California Public Utilities Code Section 8341 shares a
similar aim with Minnesota Statute Section 216H.03, subdivision 3—the 
provision challenged in Heydinger—California’s provision has yet to face 
a legal challenge, whereas Minnesota’s provision was both challenged and
struck down in Heydinger. This section then defends the California law 
using this Article’s Rules and Principles to show how California exercises
its rightful authority in a way that avoids the result in Heydinger. Lastly,
this section responds to potential arguments against California’s law and
suggests how courts may reach the proper decision, either by deferring to 
regulators to effectuate legislative intent or through a presumption against 
preemption. 
1. California as a Model to Avoid Legal Challenge—What 
It Does Right 
Climate actors outside of California likely tire of its pedestal in climate 
change policy, but the State’s active legislature and lofty environmental
goals provide an essential laboratory for democracy in the environmental 
realm. Minnesota may have been well served to follow California more 
closely in 2007 when Minnesota’s Legislature passed the NGEA.122  As
discussed above, the NGEA enacted the provisions later struck down in 
Heydinger.123 Minnesota passed the NGEA only one year after California
passed S.B. 1368. Yet, less than one decade later, Heydinger cast aside 
Minnesota’s emissions reduction and climate change policy. Because
comparable provisions in California’s S.B. 1368 remain good law, it is 
important to note aspects of California’s law that differ from Minnesota’s 
law, specifically in ways significant to FPA jurisdiction. For example,
contrast Minnesota’s law—which was overly broad in its prohibitory language 
that banned anything in the power sector that increased the state’s emissions— 
122. Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Minnesota, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, 
https://www.pca.state.mn.us/air/greenhouse-gas-emissions-minnesota-0 [https://perma.cc/
V4WT-2BQY] (last visited Apr. 6, 2019) (providing for the year the NGEA was enacted).
123. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 915–16 (8th Cir. 2016). 
233
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with California’s more precise language that narrowly tailors the regulation 
to a state performance standard, precisely applied to LSEs within California’s 
authority.
Let us begin with the party addressed in each law. California broadly 
names the retail energy providers it regulates: LSEs and POUs.124 Though 
not terribly specific, it was apparently sufficient to address only entities 
within the state’s authority. This is the least stark comparison between
California and Minnesota but is nonetheless noteworthy because Minnesota’s
provision was even broader and set a blanket mandate that “no person 
shall” violate the provision.125 While the importance of this distinction
between the states’ provision remains unclear, parties that sued Minnesota
were multi-state retail cooperatives that conducted some businesses in the 
state.126 This suggests Minnesota’s broad address caused it some trouble. 
The cooperatives’ unique business model—compared to California’s in-
state investor owned utilities (IOUs) model—gives reason to think more 
precision may have helped Minnesota. By instead addressing all persons, 
Minnesota’s cooperatives were treated no differently than out-of-state 
energy retailers under the law. The broad prohibitions Minnesota set on 
all persons put these cooperatives in a bind and differ from California’s 
method for addressing in-state IOUs and POUs. 
Next, each law proscribes a ban on actions responsible for carbon 
emissions in the electrical energy sector. In California, the banned action
is long-term financial commitment for baseload generations that do not 
comply with the performance standard set forth in other provisions
established by S.B. 1368. This now requires named parties in California 
to confirm that purchases of baseload generation are in compliance with
those in the state127—a buy-side regulation of electrical utilities that is
within California’s authority.128 This performance standard on all in-state
purchases is a traditional exercise of state police power and does not 
broadly implicate interstate activity. In contrast, Minnesota provided “no 
person shall” construct, import, or long-term contract in ways that, “would 
increase statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions.”129 Such a
prohibition is overbroad and affects groups outside Minnesota’s authority.
Although this law purports to constrain such auction purchases, energy 
purchased in the wholesale auction market from a grid operator would 
124. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(a) (Deering 2019). 
125. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216H.03, subd. 3 (West 2017). 
126.  See Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 916–17. 
127. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(a) (Deering 2019). 
128. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 24 (2002) (discussing, in dicta, that utility 
buy-side decisions are an area of traditional state authority).
129. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 216H.03, subd. 3(1)-(3) (West 2017). 
234
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constitute imports. As a result, Minnesota overstepped its authority and
infringed FERC’s plenary authority over these auction markets.
Finally, unlike in California, Minnesota’s law did not include an express 
mandate for the role of administrative agencies.  In California’s performance 
standard provisions, a state agency is charged with setting the exact
standard; although, the legislature set a rough cap on emissions that would
suffice the standard.130 This transferred responsibility to industry
professionals to provide more detailed requirements and give California 
the opportunity to reach a consensus across all levels of state energy
policymakers. This differed from Minnesota’s law where administrative 
agencies were not specifically charged in the relevant provisions.131  This 
was problematic for Minnesota because the state agencies were uncertain
as to how the law should operate.132  In Heydinger, Minnesota’s Public
Utilities Commission (MPUC) and Department of Commerce (MDOC) 
declined to clarify provisions related to the cooperatives’ concerns about
their interstate activity.133 As a result, the cooperatives successfully sued 
and had these laws removed. 
California seems to be safe from a similar outcome because the state 
agencies set the standard and must know how these laws work. For Minnesota, 
it is possible MDOC and MPUC were not on the same page as their legislature 
and thus did not know how to respond to the aggrieved cooperatives.
Likewise, MDOC and MPUC did not have the opportunity to tweak the 
impact of the law to avoid implicating the rights of parties outside the 
authority of state law. Such consideration of the administrative agencies’ 
roles may not save a facial challenge to a similar law but would at least
provide a channel to ensure tailored treatment for specific parties that are
most problematic to state regulators. 
130. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(a) (Deering 2019) (“. . . emission performance
standard established by the commission . . .”); id. §§ 8341(d)-(e) (Deering 2019). 
131. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216H.03, subd. 3 (West 2017) (providing “no person
shall . . .” but omitting any discussion of administrative and/or public entities) (emphasis 
added).
132. See North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 916 (8th Cir. 2016) (referring to 
Minnesota’s Public Utilities Commission and Department of Commerce as such state 
agencies).
133. Id. at 916. 
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2. Applying the Rules of Directness and the Guiding 
Principles to Defend California 
Despite concerns from the 2016 cases as they relate to federal regulatory
creep and FERC’s evolving role, California does not violate this Article’s 
Rules and Principles because the state’s regulations discussed above avoid 
impermissible direct effects on FERC-regulated wholesale sales. Any
effect California’s regulations have on wholesale markets is permitted as 
only indirect. References herein to the evolving FERC and federal regulatory
creep are intended only to demonstrate how these concepts are not
impediments for California. 
For consideration of directness, the Rules for state regulators apply.
Rules 5 through 8 allow direct and indirect regulatory effects on the retail
market, as well as indirect effects on the wholesale market. However, 
Rules 5 through 8 prohibit direct effects on the wholesale market.  California’s
provisions prohibit LSEs and POUs from making future “long-term financial 
commitment[s]” with baseload generation producers.134 This ban on long-
term commitments broadly encompasses business activity like power 
purchase agreements for electrical energy, but it also entails other financial 
connections LSEs may have such as construction and ownership of power 
plants.
Utility supply- or buy-side decisions and decisions regarding generation 
siting are a function of state regulations.135 Notably, various plant types 
require additional agency oversight.136 California would likely argue its 
provisions do just that: regulate utility supply- or buy-side decisions and 
generation siting. The provisions are a direct regulation of what a utility 
may contract for and reflect the utility’s ability to buy or purchase. 
As a result, California regulates the performance standard of the electric 
energy LSEs and POUs purchases.  The direct effect of this—the initial causal
effect of this regulation—is on the retail market. Any effect on the wholesale
market involves a secondary causal step from the effect on the retail market. 
Therefore, California’s direct effect on the retail market is permitted under 
Rule 7, and the indirect effect on the wholesale market is permitted under 
Rule 6. 
The Principles of the evolving FERC and federal regulatory creep should 
also factor into the analysis of state actors. The above discussion of the
evolving FERC already exposed some holes for states to consider.137  The
134. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(a) (Deering 2019). 
135. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 24 (2002).
136. For example, ISOs must approve of interconnects and nuclear plants incur unique 
federal regulations. 
137. See supra Section III.B.
236
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evolving FERC is a Principle largely because it was referenced without a 
similar notion pertaining to progression in the states. California may scoff 
at the idea that FERC is evolving at the expense of California, but the state
will not be left in the dust of other activity regulators in the energy sector.  
States like California undoubtedly have an evolving role in the energy 
sector. States too must evolve to meet new challenges as the industry
continues to transform itself and as regulators become more creative. This 
evolution will surely occur alongside FERC. 
Federal regulatory creep is the last hurdle for states.  That there may be 
a trend disfavoring state actors should be taken seriously, but California 
should remain comfortable with its legal footing in this arena. Heydinger
is more controversial than the two 2016 Supreme Court decisions, but all 
are important to understand how strong of a trend this might be. Ultimately, 
Hughes and Electric Power Supply Association are fair decisions, but
Heydinger may mislead state actors by leaving them with a belief that certain 
state actions are more threatened by legal challenge than they truly are. 
Further, Hughes should not stand for the broad proposition of federal 
regulatory creep. Though state regulators in Hughes may have acted with
good intentions, Maryland acted overzealously. The state had a problem 
and tried resolve the issue through an innovative power plant funding
mechanism. The fatal flaw resided in the regulation’s effect of setting a 
wholesale rate for the generator to receive. In short, FERC’s power is plenary 
over the wholesale market, and Maryland tried to take action state regulators
may not take in tethering policy directly to the wholesale price.
Electric Power Supply Association provides a more precise case for federal
creep.138 The Majority made a compelling case for FERC jurisdiction over 
DR price scheduling. Because FERC’s order addressed both wholesale
price setting and grid reliability, it cannot be said that DR is beyond FERC’s
jurisdiction.139 Although Justice Scalia made a strong case for FERC’s
effect on retail consumers, Electric Power Supply Association appears to
be a permissible indirect effect on the retail market.140 Therefore, Electric
138. Justices Scalia and Thomas would go further and say this is a case of federal 
creep, given their dissenting view that DR should be state jurisdiction. The pervasiveness of
DR also gives more states reason to question whether they have had some of their 
authority wrongly taken.  However, the majority’s opinion rendered this an unnecessary
fear.
139. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 779 (2016) (“In promoting
237
demand response, FERC did no more than follow the dictates of its regulatory mission 
to improve the competitiveness, efficiency, and reliability of the wholesale market.”).
140. See Rule 4.
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Power Supply Association fairly incorporated a new policy tool into FERC’s 
regulatory sphere and did not encroach on state authority.
Heydinger is the most problematic case in the 2016 series. It appears 
Minnesota went too far because a district court and three appellate judges
voted to strike down provisions in the state law. However, the Eighth 
Circuit panel split in reasoning, and the two judges that formed the
majority spent little time elaborating on their decision to preempt the state 
law under the FPA. Minnesota mandated “no person shall” contract for
power that would raise the state’s power sector emissions.141  Judge Murphy
decided the FPA preempted Minnesota’s regulation because a ban on 
wholesale contracting is a ban on wholesale sales.142 She cited to the FPA’s
reference to wholesale prices, which FERC may directly regulate and states
may only indirectly affect. The majority’s view is that banning wholesale
contracting is a ban of a wholesale sale, and a ban of a wholesale sale is a
regulation that affects price.143 Yet, the Supreme Court gave reason to question
the Eighth Circuit panel’s rationale. 
The Court’s discussion of DR in Electric Power Supply Association
helps fuel the idea that Heydinger was wrongly decided and that states 
may ban what would otherwise be wholesale contracts. Electric Power
Supply Association referenced FERC’s DR rules allowing states to opt out 
of DR participation altogether.144 These rules further provide that if a state
permits DR and DR is bid into the wholesale market, the sale is completely
within FERC’s purview and subject to its price schedule.145 The state
retains intrastate traditional control over people and businesses, and FERC 
maintains control over wholesale prices. The state’s authority to opt out 
of an otherwise wholesale sale shows that states may prohibit would-be 
wholesale sales. Although Electric Power Supply Association did not address
a challenge to this state carve-out provision, the Court at least tacitly approved 
this by expressing no concern over it.
Even if Heydinger was not wrongly decided because of the serious flaws 
in Minnesota’s legislation, the Eighth Circuit may have over-stated the
federal government’s role in energy federalism. This position also helps 
quell fears of federal regulatory creep. A more conservative position—in 
lieu of overruling Heydinger—concurs with the result of striking down the
law but dissents with the Heydinger court’s rationale. This position recognizes 
the flaws in Minnesota’s legislation while acknowledging that Minnesota 
141. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216H.03, subd. 3 (West 2017). 
142. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 926 (8th Cir. 2016) (Murphy, J., 
concurring). 
143. Id. at 928 (Colloton, J., concurring). 
144. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 771 (2016). 
145. Id. at 772. 
238
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could implement some prohibitions the state sought to achieve.  The  
Heydinger court made it seem like there was no quick fix—that the overall
purpose of the law was to impermissibly ban wholesale contracting. As 
shown in Electric Power Supply Association with DR, there are policies
with ample federal regulations which still provide states their traditional
roles. That is akin to California setting quality standards for goods
purchased intrastate even though the federal government determines the 
fate of those goods interstate. Again, this all supports the notion that states 
need not fear the results from the line of 2016 cases as a sign of things to 
come.
3. A Potential Argument and Response 
Those challenging California’s provision would likely argue Heydinger
is on point and not wholly distinguishable because California’s regulation 
bans wholesale sales. In Heydinger, prohibiting retail providers from 
contracting for power purchase agreements or imports was found to be a 
direct effect on the wholesale market.146  There are differences in the two
states’ statutory provisions, but these differences are not legally significant
here due to the court’s broad reasoning in Heydinger.  The Heydinger court 
suggested there was no possible quick fix to the statute and instead found
the ban on wholesale sales to be a fatal flaw. This view could render 
California’s provision impermissible because it too bans wholesale sales.
Courts should reject that view, however, and either decline to follow 
Heydinger or distinguish California’s provision from Minnesota’s.147  Courts
could both share this sentiment regarding Heydinger and agree with the
Eighth Circuit’s result, if they believe Minnesota’s statute expands beyond
utility supply-side decisions and invades FERC’s regulatory space. This 
view accepts the court’s decision to strike the Minnesota provision but
also notes the court’s doctrinal confusion and overstatement of the limited
impact of states on wholesale markets.
If a court viewed Heydinger as just described, it would still strike down
the Minnesota provision rejecting the outright ban on states’ ability to
contract in ways that would otherwise be part of the wholesale market.
Minnesota inexplicably targets power imports from “outside the state” in
one provision and “long-term power purchase agreements” in the other, 
146. Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 921; id. at 926–27 (Murphy, J. concurring). 
147. Or overturn Heydinger if it is the Supreme Court. 
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using the exact language the law applied for jurisdictional reaches of the 
federal government.148 This language unnecessarily invoked the feeling 
of federal jurisdiction. In contrast, similar legislation in California regulates 
only “long term financial commitments” and is clearly constructed to apply
only to that which utilities may purchase and supply.149 Alternatively, one
could defend California’s law altogether by arguing the Eighth Circuit 
wrongly decided Heydinger. As discussed below in the review of Electric
Power Supply Association, it is possible Minnesota was not in the wrong 
in Heydinger—particularly in light of how the Supreme Court in Electric
Power Supply Association considered state authority under FERC’s DR 
policy.
4. Final Guidance 
For now, California’s law appears safe from legal challenge.150  There
are two last ideas to prevent courts from wrongfully striking down the law 
of a state climate actor: (1) Employ deference to the regulator as to the
intent of the action in determining what it affects; or (2) Employ a presumption
against preemption.  Both alternatives may provide guardrails on judicial 
decision-making.
That energy regulation employs cooperative federalism indicates there
may be a muddled interplay wherein each party has some effect on the 
other.151 To protect the delicate balance, courts may decide to give deference
to regulators as to their claims of what a certain regulation aims to achieve.  
Courts should also avoid too easily determining an impact to be a direct
effect. In Electric Power Supply Association, FERC claimed its regulations
targeted wholesale sales and that such regulation was within its power,
despite potential impacts such regulations might have on retail markets.
Still, this suggested deference does not imply courts should defer to anything
regulators claim to be the definitive or legitimate goal of a regulation.  In
Hughes, Maryland claimed it acted within its traditional regulatory role 
over state power plants but did not hide the fact that it also directly set a
wholesale rate. If Maryland should receive any recognition for directly
regulating in its retail capacity, at best it was also “indirectly achiev[ing]
148. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 216H.03, subd. 3(2)-(3) (West 2017). 
149. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(a) (Deering 2019). 
150. Here I refer specifically to the earlier discussion of the security of California’s
law as constructed, its adherence to FPA’s jurisdictional boundaries as shown through my
Rules and Principles, and through predicted responses to a legal challenge.
151. See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1300 (2016) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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the same result” as a direct state regulation of wholesale sales—Justice
Kagan’s cautionary prohibition.152 
If courts opt not to defer to regulators in similar circumstances, then
perhaps regulatory affects analyses should carry a presumption against
preemption.153 The second alternative to prevent courts from wrongfully
striking down state climate laws would do just that.  Where there is potential 
conflict between a state law and a power reserved to the federal government, 
the presumption against preemption would require courts to, “start[] with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the [s]tates were not to
be superseded . . . unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”154 This would remind courts of the state-jurisdictional regulatory
sphere, in light of FERC’s authority over the wholesale market. At minimum,
this presumption against preemption may force careful consideration of 
what affects are direct versus indirect to avoid the accidental over-
prescription of direct affects. 
V. CONCLUSION
As has hopefully become plain, Heydinger produced an unsatisfying 
doctrinal analysis, in-fighting over institutional understanding of electrical 
energy, a split appellate panel, and an unhappy observer.155 That said, 
Heydinger dangerously appears to be a cut-and-dry case. This danger is
exacerbated by Electric Power Supply Association and Hughes, both of
which either struck down a state regulation or decided in favor of FERC’s 
evolving jurisdiction.
States like California should not perceive Heydinger as the misguided 
case it may facially appear to be.156 Sister circuits and the Supreme Court
should not view Heydinger broadly—if favorably at all—and should
closely determine what a regulator aims to achieve with a given regulation 
and direct effects thereof. Doing so may ensure indirect effects, even if 
substantial, are not perceived as impermissible regulatory actions.
152. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 780 (2016). 
153. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 17 (2002) (explaining the “presumption 
against preemption” analysis involves questions of either the scope of federal power or
whether state action conflicting with federal authority is displaced by such federal authority;
here the court defined the scope of federal power rather than impute a presumption). 
154. Id. at 18. 
155. This author. 
156. Still, the Federal Court of Appeals precedent from Heydinger is not something 
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The aforementioned Rules of Directness provide some conceptual guidance 
for state climate actors.157 These Rules should adequately enunciate the
jurisdictional boundary at which FERC and state regulators may permissibly
operate. State climate actors must understand this federal-state boundary
to ensure they may aggressively regulate in their capacity as sovereigns, 
within appropriate legal bounds.  Furthermore, California provides a specific
example regarding how state regulators may utilize their authority in enacting 
and enforcing climate- and energy-focused regulations. Courts may also 
wish to apply the Rules of Directness in future cases to explicate the current—
or rather, ever evolving—understanding of federal-state jurisdictional boundaries
in the context of energy regulation.  Courts may employ other tools as 
guardrails to ensure such a tailored analysis occurs.158  Between the Rules
of Directness and other protective tools at the judiciary’s disposal, courts 
can more easily dissect energy policy to allow survival of regulations properly
within their purview and to accurately describe how impermissible regulations 
reach beyond the applicable regulators’ authority.
157. See supra page 225.
158. For example, courts may extend deference or provide a presumption against 
preemption to prevent hastily rendering a decision in the complex world of energy federalism.
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